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The binding problem in perception is concerned with answering the question how infor-
mation from millions of sensory receptors, processed by millions of neurons working in
parallel, can be merged into a unified percept. Binding in perception reaches from the
lowest levels of feature binding up to the levels of multimodal binding of information com-
ing from the different sensor modalities and also from other functional systems. The last
40 years of research have shown that the binding problem cannot be solved easily.Today, it
is considered as one of the key questions to brain understanding.To date, various solutions
have been suggested to the binding problem including: (1) combination coding, (2) binding
by synchrony, (3) population coding, (4) binding by attention, (5) binding by knowledge,
expectation, and memory, (6) hardwired vs. on-demand binding, (7) bundling and binding
of features, (8) the feature-integration theory of attention, and (9) synchronization through
top-down processes. Each of those hypotheses addresses important aspects of binding.
However, each of them also suffers from certain weak points and can never give a com-
plete explanation. This article gives a brief overview of the so far suggested solutions of
perceptual binding and then shows that those are actually not mutually exclusive but can
complement each other. A computationally verified model is presented which shows that,
most likely, the different described mechanisms of binding act (1) at different hierarchical
levels and (2) in different stages of “perceptual knowledge acquisition.”The model further-
more considers and explains a number of inhibitory “filter mechanisms” that suppress the
activation of inappropriate or currently irrelevant information.
Keywords: perception, binding problem, combination coding, temporal coding, population coding, focus of
attention, knowledge, inhibition
INTRODUCTION
The binding problem in perception is concerned with answering
the question how information from millions of sensory recep-
tors, processed by millions of neurons working in parallel, can be
merged in to a unified percept. Finding an answer to this question
is on the one hand crucial for understanding the functioning of the
brain and therefore tackles researchers from various disciplines of
brain sciences. On the other hand, gaining insight into this topic is
also highly valuable for a subfield of engineering called“Brain-Like
Machine Perception” (Velik, 2008). Brain-Like Machine Percep-
tion is concerned with developing brain-inspired concepts and
technologies for a new generation of information processing and
automation systems. The motivation for the research presented
here comes exactly from this latter discipline and originated from
the following challenge: sensor technology is getting smaller and
smaller while at the same time becoming cheaper and cheaper.
The consequence is that in future, systems like robots or building
automation systems will be equipped with a larger number (up to
millions) of individual sensors. This will enable completely new
application domains. However, today’s technical approaches can-
not cope with the processing and interpretation of such a flood
of incoming data. Novel concepts are needed (Velik et al., 2011).
One way to find a potential solution to this challenge is to take
inspiration from the brain – a system that is capable of processing
information from millions of sensory receptors and merging them
into unified percepts.
Driven by this idea, we formed an interdisciplinary research
team of engineers and brain scientists and worked on the devel-
opment of a technically implementable model of the human
perceptual system of the brain – a task which included also an
extensive study of the binding problem in perception. During
the course of this research, we did not only develop innovative
concepts and methods for future engineering systems, but also
gained new insights and formulated new hypotheses concerning
brain functioning. While engineering aspects of this work and a
first draft of the overall model from the viewpoint of cognitive
sciences have already been presented elsewhere (see for instance
Velik, 2010a,b,c; Velik and Boley, 2010), the article of this special
issue shall now particularly focus on a description of newly gained
insights and hypotheses concerning the binding and inhibition
mechanisms involved in perception. For this purpose, we first give
a summary of so far suggested potential solutions to the binding
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problem and their strengths and weak points in Chapter 2 followed
by a presentation of our proposed perceptual binding model in
Chapter 3. The model is based on a conclusive combination of
so far suggested potential solutions to the binding problem and
further supplementary considerations and hypotheses including
several inhibition mechanisms coming from feedback connections
and top-down guided mechanisms. The principal functionality of
the resulting model is validated via computational simulations.
The next step to take, which is not covered by this article, is to
search for physiological support of the suggested hypotheses by
experiments and observations in animals or humans. With this
article, we would like to encourage other research groups to join
this verification process.
STRENGTHS ANDWEAK POINTS OF CURRENT BINDING
HYPOTHESES
WHAT IS THE BINDING PROBLEM? – A FIRST SIMPLIFIED
EXPLANATION
The binding problem in perception takes its origin in the field of
Gestalt psychology, which was concerned with trying to under-
stand by what principles visual features tend to be grouped to
particular perceived objects. According the identified Gestalt prin-
ciples, such a grouping is done based on properties like proximity,
continuity, simplicity, closure, similarity, figure-ground distinc-
tion, and common fate (movement into same direction). The
binding problem as considered today goes a step further and tries
to investigate what processing mechanisms lie behind such“group-
ing effects” within and across modalities. The principal problem
that current brain science has with understanding how informa-
tion is “bound” in perception is probably best explained by a
concrete example (see Figure 1). The most extensive discussion of
binding has so far concerned binding in visual perception. The pre-
sented example constitutes an extended version of F. Rosenblatt’s
classical illustration of the binding problem from his book “Prin-
ciples of Neurodynamics: Perceptrons and the Theory of Brain
Mechanisms” (von der Malsburg, 1995, 1999). The example con-
cerns binding of visual information. At the input of a hypothetical
neural network consisting of six neurons, different visual images
are presented that can either be yellow or blue triangles or rectan-
gles in an upper or lower position. In order to process the incoming
information, in analogy to observations made in the visual cortex,
different neurons of the network respond to different features of
those objects. In the example, two neurons respond to the shape of
objects (neuron 1 to triangles, neuron 2 to squares) and two further
neurons respond to the color of objects (neuron 3 to yellow,neuron
3 to blue). Last but not least, the two remaining neurons represent
the position of the objects (neuron 5 means upper position, neu-
ron 6 means lower position). If now for example either a yellow
triangle in the top position or a blue square in the bottom position
is presented, always the three corresponding “feature neurons” are
activated. However, a problem occurs in the case that not only
one but two objects are presented to the network simultaneously.
In this case, all six feature neurons are activated concurrently and
without further measures, it cannot be concluded which feature
belongs to what object. Finding out how the brain solves this issue
to come to unified correct percepts is the so-called binding prob-
lem. The binding problem is not limited to perception. Similar
FIGURE 1 | Classical illustration of the binding problem.
mechanisms are also necessary for other brain functions includ-
ing sensor-motor function, memory, and consciousness (Roskies,
1999). For this reason, the binding problem is considered as one
of the key questions to brain understanding (Triesch and von der
Malsburg, 1996).
Within the last decades, researchers have intensively worked
on finding a solution to the binding problem. We already pre-
sented an extensive overview and discussion of so far suggested
solutions to the binding problem in (Velik, 2010d). In the fol-
lowing sections, we give a summary of this information as far as
it is relevant for understanding the model and hypotheses that
will be described in Chapter 3. While Section “Proposed Binding
Mechanisms” describes individual so far suggested mechanisms,
Section “Proposed Combinations of Binding Mechanisms” is con-
cerned with illustrating what combinations of those individual
mechanisms have so far been proposed.
PROPOSED BINDING MECHANISMS
Combination coding
In the 1960s, the Noble price winners Hubel and Wiesel (1962)
reported that the visual cortex shows a hierarchical organization.
Each hierarchical level receives and processes information from
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earlier levels. This way, incoming information is merged and con-
densed from layer to layer leading to more and more complex
perceptual representations in higher levels that cover information
from larger receptive field sizes.
Based on this notion, the hypothesis of combination coding
(also called convergent hierarchical coding or grandmother-cell
hypothesis) was introduced. Combination coding cells (also called
connector cells, cardinal cells, or grandmother cells) always receive
convergent input from neurons or populations of neurons of ear-
lier levels and therefore only react to particular combinations of
features. This way, incoming information from earlier processing
stages is integrated and condensed more and more at higher lev-
els. A simple example for how combination coding can work is
given in Figure 2 (left). Similar like in the example in Figure 1, the
task that shall be performed by the hypothetical neural network
is to detect the simultaneous presence of a yellow triangle in the
upper position and a blue square in the lower position. Accord-
ing to the combination coding hypothesis, in order to achieve this
task, there has to exist a particular neuron for each possible com-
bination of the features (shape, color, and position). The image
representations currently present then result in an activation of
the appropriate neurons.
According to combination coding, neural representations are
becoming increasingly complex from level to level. At each par-
ticular level, a single neuron or a small group of neurons receives
convergent input from neurons or populations of neurons from
lower hierarchical levels. As noted by Sir Charles Sherrington in
his book “Man on His Nature” (1941), following this integration
scheme, this could in the extreme case lead to one ultimate pon-
tifical cell as the climax of the whole system. Sherrington however
rejected this idea as improbable. In accordance with this, Barlow
(1972) suggested that the concept of the pontifical cell should be
replaced by a number of “combination cells” from which only a
few fire concurrently in order to represent the current perception
of the body and the environment.
Evidence for the combination coding hypothesis has been
reported particularly for the visual cortex which shows a grad-
ual decrease of retinotopic specificity from layer to layer together
with an increase in receptive field size and an increase in com-
plexity of stimulus features to which neurons respond (Hubel
and Wiesel, 1962). Models that map these observations of a
hierarchical feed forward architecture for simple form recog-
nition have been presented by Riesenhuber and Poggio (1999,
2002).
Although at first sight, the combination coding hypothesis
seems to be very intuitive, it suffers from certain weak points.
The first criticism concerns the question of how cell connectivity
patters of such high specificity should be formed. To acquire them
by learning would need many examples of all possible objects,
shapes, colors, sizes, rotations at all possible locations of the per-
ceptual field. On the other hand, prewiring cell connections would
require the storage of all this information in the genes, which is
also unlikely (Triesch and von der Malsburg, 1996). A second crit-
icism concerns the fact that combination coding could need as
many connector cells as there are distinguishable objects. If a con-
nector cell was to represent a whole class of objects, it would not
be able to represent fine object details. On the other hand, if there
existed a cell for all objects showing general similarities but differ-
ences in details (e.g., one and the same face with different facial
expressions), this would quickly lead to a combinatorial explosion.
Furthermore, this would mean that many cells would have to be
silent for long times (up to decades) before their patterns appear
again (von der Malsburg, 1981).
Population coding
A proposed alternative to overcome the combinatorial explo-
sion of convergent hierarchical coding is population coding (also
called distributed coding; Gray, 1999; Goldstein, 2002). The prin-
ciple of population coding is explained by the example given in
Figure 3.
FIGURE 2 | Combination coding vs. binding by synchronous firing.
FIGURE 3 | Combination coding vs. population coding.
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In this example, a particular face shall be recognized. While
in combination coding, there would exist a particular neuron (or
group of neurons) for each known face, population coding would
follows another principle. According to population coding, such
complex features are not represented by individual nerve cells but
by a whole population of distributed neurons of the same or differ-
ent cortical levels. A particular sensory input pattern then activates
a particular firing pattern in this population. To make this concept
plausible, one could imagine that the population of neurons con-
sists of individual neurons representing archetypical faces. If now
a particular face shall be recognized, the “archetype faces” are acti-
vated more or less strongly depending on the grade of similarity
with the presented image thus leading to a specific activation pat-
tern inside the neural population. In comparison to combination
coding, by this coding scheme, the representational capacity of
the network would be greatly increased as the number of possible
distinct stimulus patterns is by far higher than the number of neu-
rons necessary to represent them. Thus the issue of combinatorial
explosion would no longer pose a problem.
The theory is supported by physiological evidence from sen-
sory and non-sensory cortical areas and has shown to mesh well
with various aspects of the physiological and anatomical orga-
nization of the visual cortex. For instance, Haxby et al. (2001)
showed using functional magnetic resonance imaging that in the
ventral temporal cortex, the representation of faces and objects
is widely distributed and overlapping. Similarly, O’Toole et al.
(2005) reported for the same brain area that object categories
with shared image-based attributes have shared neural structures.
Quian Quiroga et al. (2007a,b) conducted experiments in the
medial temporal lobe to investigate population vs. combination
coding and pleaded for this brain area in favor of a spares but not
“grandmother-cell” coding.
Although population coding seems to play an important role in
binding, the theory again seems to be incomplete. A problem with
this hypothesis arises when more than one object of the same
group appears in the same scene. The unanswered question –
referred to as superposition problem – is how a particular pattern
can be identified from the many other patterns represented by the
same network concurrently without interference.
Synchronous firing
To avoid the combinatorial explosion that would follow from
combination coding and furthermore overcome the superposi-
tion problem of population coding, the hypothesis of binding
by synchronous firing (also called binding by synchrony, tempo-
ral binding, or temporal correlation hypothesis) was suggested
by Legendy (1970), Milner (1974), and von der Malsburg (1981)
who formulated it independently from each other (von der Mals-
burg, 1999). The basic principle of binding by synchronous firing
is illustrated in Figure 2 (right) and suggests that binding can
be solved by temporal correlations in firing patterns. The task to
perform in Figure 2 is again the same as described in the exam-
ples in the Sections “What is the Binding Problem? – A First
Simplified Explanation” and “Combination Coding.” With the
hypothesis of temporal coding, a temporal dimension is invoked to
cell responses. This means that neurons representing features (in
our case shape, color, and position) belonging to the same object
are correlated in time while neurons representing features of differ-
ent objects are anti-correlated in time, i.e., their firing patterns are
independent. This way, multiple feature combinations can coexist
in the same network (Treisman, 1996; Ghose and Maunsell, 1999;
Fries, 2005).
The temporal binding hypothesis seems plausible as the out-
put patterns of neurons depend on the precise timing of their
synaptic inputs. Ghose and Maunsell (1999) have reported that
humans are sensitive to timing differences down to 150µs. In
the last 15 years, experimental evidence from the visual system
has been provided that supports the temporal coding hypothe-
sis (Ghose and Maunsell, 1999; Jacobs et al., 2007). Gray et al.
(1989) found in-phase neural oscillations for neurons with over-
lapping receptive fields and non-in-phase oscillations for cells with
no such overlap. Amongst others, Gray (1999), von der Malsburg
(1999), and Gabriel (2004) suggested a time range of 1–10 ms
for synchronous firing. Usrey et al. (2000) support this state-
ment by physiological evidence and report that the time window
for reinforcement of heterosynaptic interaction is shorter than
7 ms in the cat geniculocortical pathway. Singer (2001) describes
oscillatory modulations of neural firing patterns in the gamma-
frequency range (30–90 Hz). Fries et al. (2001) discovered that
gamma-frequency synchronization causes spikes to coincide in a
range of 10 ms.
Despite these results, the role of synchronous neuron firing in
feature binding is still controversial. Grossberg and Grunewald
(1996) suggest that synchronization rather has the function of
“perceptual framing” of non-constant retinal images. According
to them, in case of motion in the retinal image, a mechanism
is needed to ensure that parts in the image belonging together
are still processed together. Otherwise, illusory conjunctions can
occur. Via perceptual framing, parts of an image are re-bound by
resynchronizing network inputs with a temporal offset less than a
critical delay.
Sharkey (1998) expresses her doubts about temporal binding
and points out that there is no evidence that neurons can respond
to synchronous input with the precision that would be necessary.
Furthermore it is criticized that the observations of synchrony
were made in anesthetized animals. The correlation might there-
fore have been a consequence of anesthesia. Stryker (1989) pointed
out that further work is needed demonstrating that those oscil-
latory phenomena are also definitely present in awake animals.
Schultz et al. (2001) analyze the limits in terms of amount of
information that can be extracted from an observer from such a
synchronous code in order to determine if this amount is suffi-
cient to allow for computational processes like feature binding.
However, no final conclusion is drawn by them. Another point of
discussion is that observed synchronous firing could also just be
an artifact of binding instead of the crucial binding mechanism
(Ghose and Maunsell, 1999). The hypothesis of temporal binding
is only about how binding is signaled, not about how it is com-
puted. Thus synchrony could be rather the result than the cause
for binding. Ghose and Maunsell (1999) point out that this there-
fore begs the question how synchrony is achieved. Stryker (1989)
indicates that the observation of rhythmic oscillations and their
correlation with particular stimuli does not allow the conclusion
that the brain makes use of this information.
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Golledge et al. (1996) indicate that physiologically, the estab-
lishment of synchrony is too slow to account for normal object
recognition in familiar situations. In order to provide a binding
mechanism, synchronous firing would have to occur very close to
stimulus onset. However, observations have shown that synchro-
nization is not phase-locked to the onset of the stimulus and starts
at a variable time after presentation of the stimulus. Later studies
of Fries et al. (2001) and Stefanics et al. (2005) however partly
invalidated this criticism by reporting about findings of partly
phase-locked stimuli onsets in the gamma-frequency range.
Sharkey (1998) reports that maybe binding by synchronous fir-
ing is not computed in the primary cortex but instead imposed
via top-down feedback connections from higher levels (see also
Top-Down Synchronization).
Ghose and Maunsell (1999) indicate that binding by synchrony
was suggested in order to overcome the hypothetical combina-
torial explosion emerging with convergent hierarchical coding.
They however provide calculations concerning the number of neu-
rons needed in the visual cortex in order to represent all possibly
occurring distinguishable visual perceptions and conclude that
the combinatorial explosion is not really a problem and that thus
temporal correlation is no compelling need for binding. Based on
their findings, Ghose and Maunsell (1999) suggest that, although
there is no absolute need for temporal binding in everyday life
situations, it could be important during recognition learning (see
On-Demand vs. Hardwired Coding).
Attention
A problem with the hypothesis of binding by synchrony is that
spatial information of combined features is lost. Treisman and
Gelade (1980) suggested that focused attention plays a crucial role
in solving the binding problem. They suggest that visual informa-
tion is first coded in several separate dimensions including color,
brightness, orientation, and direction of movement. Via focused
attention, those features are then related to each other to form
objects. For this purpose, not all information is processed and
integrated simultaneously but is limited top-down to one object
per space and time. Once this information is processed, the fea-
tures of the next object are merged. Thus, information processing
is “serialized” via focal attention. The favorite metaphor for visual
attention is therefore a spotlight. Only information that is cur-
rently in this “mental beam of light” is processed. This way, spatial
information of features is obtained indirectly by restricting the
current binding area to a certain region (Hommel and Milliken,
2007). This “beam of attention” can either be directed to small
areas to obtain information with high resolution or to larger areas
which results in a perception with less detail. Chun and Wolfe
(2001) suggest that via attention currently relevant information
is selected and interfering or irrelevant information is ignored
according to the goals and state of the perceiver.
Ghose and Maunsell (1999) indicate that attention may also
play a role in differentiating objects which at first glance seem the
same. They describe further discrimination as a sequential process
that requires sequential processing. This way, perceptions of higher
detail level can be achieved.
Treisman and Gelade (1980) report that attention is needed for
the correct perception of conjunctions. However, the mechanism
of focused attention, by which information processing is “seri-
alized,” cannot be reconciled with the speed with which object
recognition can take place. Riesenhuber and Poggio (1999) and
Gray (1999) therefore suggest that object recognition does not
base on focus of attention alone but that there have to act mecha-
nisms prior to attention, which additionally serve to attract it (see
Bundling and Binding).
Knowledge, memory, and expectation
While more classic approaches consider the perceptual system and
the brain as a whole rather as a passive, stimulus-driven system,
more recent theories point out the active nature of perception,
which seems to be controlled by top-down processes. Apart from
focus of attention, further top-down processes acting on percep-
tion and taking a role in binding are semantic knowledge, context
knowledge, memory, expectation, and mechanisms related to these
concepts. This notion is today supported by various researchers.
Engel et al. (2001) indicate that sensory-motor processes, cogni-
tion, and behavior are to a large extend not reflex-like, based on
incoming (sensory) stimuli, but also heavily influenced by expec-
tations derived from generalized knowledge and experience coded
in cortical networks. Similarly, Ernst and Buelthoff (2004) report
that for interpreting (ambiguous) sensor signals, prior knowledge
is often necessary. Wolfe and Cave (1999) point out that different
patterns could be produced by the same stimuli due to differ-
ent expectations of a subject. Engel et al. (2001) point out that
top-down processes assure perceptual and cognitive processing to
be fast and reliable. Using these mechanisms, predictions about
forthcoming stimuli can be made, which are then continuously
matched against signals from the environment and body. Treis-
man and Gelade (1980), who suggested focused attention to be a
binding mechanism, furthermore indicated that contextual infor-
mation and past experiences take a role in the binding process.
Accordingly, it is for instance unlikely that we will perceive a blue
sun and a yellow sky even if attention is directed elsewhere. Addi-
tionally, they point out that features, once correctly bound by
focused attention, continue to be perceived and stored this way.
The same observation was made by Hommel (1998) who indicates
that not all phenomena can be explained by temporal integration
trough attention alone, like for example the experience of object
constancy despite changes in some features over time. Without
additional mechanisms, as soon as attention is shifted, this infor-
mation would be lost again. There is thus some kind of memory
and knowledge needed acting top-down to preserve the informa-
tion (Wolfe and Cave, 1999; Engel et al., 2001). In the process
of applying top-down mechanisms on incoming stimuli, the pre-
frontal and parietal cortex seem to play a particularly important
role (Frith and Dolan, 1997; Miller and Cohen, 2001).
Models incorporating top-down processes usually suggest that
predictions about features of the surrounding are expressed by
firing patterns traveling from higher to lower hierarchical pro-
cessing levels via feedback connections where then a comparison
of predicted perceptions with sensory input takes place (Engel
et al., 2001). Ullman (1995) indicates that the interaction between
top-down and bottom-up processes can occur at any intermediate
level. The only condition is that they have to arrive simultane-
ously. Engel et al. (2001) suggest that a mismatch of bottom-up
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and top-down signals causes an extinction of signals in early levels
while a match leads to an amplification.
Despite its many advantages, the usage of knowledge, memory,
and expectation can also be cause of misperceptions. In familiar
situations, top-down prediction of objects and events can lead to
fast and efficient information processing. However, in unfamil-
iar situations with misleading context, predictive expectations can
lead to wrong interpretations of stimuli. While top-down processes
usually interact with incoming sensory stimuli to “create” per-
ception, in some cases, they can even act in complete absence of
incoming stimuli. This situation occurs in perceptual hallucina-
tions of subjects with schizophrenia but also in normal subjects
during mental imagery (Frith and Dolan, 1997).
PROPOSED COMBINATIONS OF BINDING MECHANISMS
As reported in (Treisman, 1996) different binding mechanisms
suggested so far are not mutually exclusive. Accordingly, as
described in the following sub-sections, different authors have
already suggested a combination of particular binding mecha-
nisms for explaining feature binding.
On-demand vs. hardwired coding
In Section “Synchronous Firing,” it was outlined that temporal
coding is particularly flexible and economic in terms of cogni-
tive structure. However, it has been criticized as this mechanism
would not be able to perform binding with the speed necessary in
familiar environments as even features that are very likely to occur
together would need to be bound anew every time. Therefore,
Colzato et al. (2006), Hommel and Colzato (2009), and VanRullen
(2009) suggested that there exist two distinct binding mechanisms
in perception. For frequently encountered and important objects,
hardwired binding (combination coding) is applied. For more
arbitrary or meaningless feature combinations, an on-demand
temporal coding mechanism is used. VanRullen (2009) suggested
that on-demand binding is always mediated by attention. In con-
trast, hardwired binding can work without attention for single
objects but needs attention if multiple objects are present in the
receptive field.
Golledge et al. (1996) propose that, rather than for the percep-
tion of familiar objects, temporal binding might take a particular
role in recognition learning, which can have a longer time course.
von der Malsburg (1995) indicates that binding by synchrony has
a limited bandwidth of neural signals. However, stereotypical tasks
show very short reaction times that cannot be explained by tem-
poral binding. Thus he suggests that the more time-expensive
synchronous binding is only used for novel situations. Once a
cellular binding structure has turned out to have a long term
value, it is stabilized into faster but less flexible specialized cir-
cuits. This hypothesis would be in line with Hebb’s cell assembly
theory (Hebb, 1949) according to which cells that fire together
(i.e., show synchronous firing patters) start wiring together until
they result in faster and therefore more efficient hardwired struc-
tures. Singer (2001) supports this hypothesis by indicating that
neural connection achieved via temporal binding can be stabilized
through learning. In this process, synchrony could be invoked
either via focus of attention or maybe in-phase firing patters of
topographically correlated cells.
Bundling and binding
In Section “Attention,” attention was suggested as a binding mech-
anism. However, as described there, attention alone cannot explain
the speed with which perception takes place. Accordingly, Treis-
man and Gelade (1980) proposed for visual perception that con-
junctions are also formed in the absence of focused attention,
however rather on a random basis. Thus, if attention is overloaded
or directed elsewhere, illusory conjunction can occur. In accor-
dance with this view, patients with parietal lobes damage in the
regions involved in allocation of attention have shown to lead to
illusory conjunctions (Reynolds and Desimone, 1999). Reynolds
and Desimone (1999) report that the number of incorrectly bound
feature conjunctions increase exponentially with the number of
objects in the receptive field. Thus higher receptive levels rep-
resenting lager receptive fields are more sensitive to erroneous
feature conjunctions. Attention is the mechanism to resolve these
incorrect feature bindings by restricting the spatial area in which
information is processed at a certain moment.
In relation to this, Wolfe and Cave (1999) suggest that binding
involves an early pre-attentive and a later attentive stage of process-
ing. In the early levels of processing, i.e., the primary visual cortex,
features are represented by spatially organized (topographic) maps
of the visual field. This means that neighboring neurons in the
retina project their information on neighboring neurons in the
primary cortex. Thus, at those lowest levels, this implicit location
information serves as means for interrelating features belonging to
a particular object and therefore prevents features from “free float-
ing.” Nevertheless, although all necessary information is present at
those early levels, those features are rather“loosely bundled together
than tightly bound.” Without attention, it is probably not possible
to recode those interrelations of features into memory. In higher
processing levels, the specific location information of features is no
longer available as there, information is no longer arranged topo-
graphically. Therefore, selective attention is necessary for binding
it at those higher stages.
Feature-integration theory of attention
According to the feature-integration theory of attention suggest by
Treisman and Gelade (1980), which shows some similarities to the
bundling and binding theory, features like color, brightness, direc-
tion of movement, orientation, etc. are detected automatically and
in parallel in early levels of visual processing. In contrast, objects
are registered separately in later stages. Awareness for objects is
obtained in two different ways: (1) through focused attention and
(2) via top-down processes basing on contextual knowledge and
memory of past events/percepts. Usually, those processes work
synergistically. However, in extreme cases, they might work almost
independently.
Top-down synchronization
In Section “Synchronous Firing,” it was outlined that synchro-
nous neural firing might play a role in binding. However, the
question what the function of neural synchrony in early process-
ing levels is and how it can be achieved is controversial. Several
authors suggest that synchronous neural firing might be imposed
via top-down feedback connections from higher cortical areas rep-
resenting functional relationships during stages of attention or
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expectancy (Sharkey, 1998; Engel et al., 2001; Fries et al., 2001;
Fries, 2005). In the process of synchronous firing, also different
neurotransmitter systems (e.g., cholinergic or dopaminergic) and
astrocytes could theoretically play a role, which are however not
further discussed in the current article.
Fries (2005) proposes that via the top-down mechanisms, a
modulatory input is provided to selected neural cell groups of
earlier cortical levels. In the case of attention, neural groups are
defined by their topographic position in the receptive sensor map.
Thus, by synchronous firing induced by attention mechanisms,
currently relevant areas are selected and transformed from a spa-
tial (topographic) code to a temporal code. Apart from locations,
attention can also be directed toward different modalities or par-
ticular object features (e.g., color or movement; Engel et al., 2001).
In support of this hypothesis, recent studies of Fries (2005) have
shown that spikes coming from neurons representing attended
features are more precisely gamma-band synchronized than the
spikes of neurons representing unattended stimuli. Fries (2005)
further reports that thalamic nuclei and other “broadcasting cen-
ters” with widespread reciprocal connections within the cortex
could take over the function of distributing the synchronization
rhythms. Selectivity could be achieved via specific rhythms sent to
particular areas. Engel et al. (2001) report about studies accord-
ing to which, apart from attention, also states of “anticipation”
and “expectancy” can be represented via temporally synchronized
activity patterns that occur before the appearance of stimuli.
Engel et al. (2001) suggest that the synchronization effect
caused by attention is detectable in the primary cortical areas.
Nevertheless, the extent to which synchronization can be observed
increases in higher cortical levels. However, this effect might not be
caused by attentional mechanisms (alone) but also by knowledge,
memory, and expectation.
INTEGRATIVE SOLUTION
In Chapter 2, different so far suggested hypotheses concerning
the binding problem have been presented. Each of the proposed
mechanisms seems to address some important aspects of binding.
Nevertheless, none of them could so far give a complete answer. As
the different solutions are however not contradictory, a conclusive
combination of them might lead to a more satisfactory explana-
tion of how binding in perception works. In this Chapter, such an
“integrative” solution is proposed and the underlying perceptual
model is described.
MODEL OVERVIEW
In Figure 4, an overview of the proposed model is presented. The
model covers perceptual information processing from the level
of sensory receptors up to the level of multimodal perception
and includes the visual, auditory, and somatosensory modality.
Following research findings reported by Luria (1973), perceptual
information processing in the model is divided into three lev-
els, from which each level can consist of several sub-layers (Velik,
2008). In the first two levels, corresponding to the function of the
primary and secondary perceptual cortex, information for each
sensory modality is mainly processed separately and in parallel
(see Representation of Location Information for exceptions). In
the first level, neurons – here represented by cubes – respond to
relatively simple features. For the visual modality, examples for
FIGURE 4 | Overview of “integrative” solution to the binding problem.
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processed features are lines, edges, colors, or movements in to a
certain direction always at a certain location of the receptive field.
Examples for the acoustic modality could be sounds of a certain
frequency. The primary cortices are topographic, meaning that
for each modality, neighboring receptors project on neighboring
neurons in the cortex. Information is therefore highly location
dependent. On the second level, activated neurons (or groups of
neurons) – here represented by circles – respond to whole uni-
fied percepts of each modality. Examples for the visual modality
would be faces, objects, persons, etc. and for the acoustic modal-
ity voices, melodies, etc. Representations are independent of the
concrete location, orientation, size, etc. of the perceptual images.
On the third level, corresponding to functions of the tertiary cor-
tex, information from different sensory modalities is merged. An
example for processing in this level would be the correlation of a
visual image of a person with a voice to recognize that those two
percepts belong together and that a particular person is currently
talking.
The model shows a feedforward “simple-to-complex” hierar-
chy as reported by Hubel and Wiesel (1962) but additionally
comprises feedback connections (see Feedforward and Feedback
Connections). Furthermore, perceptual processing does not only
depend on information coming from receptors but is also heavily
influenced by top-down processes like knowledge, memory, and
expectation (see Focus of Attention) and focus of attention (see
Representation of Location Information).
FEEDFORWARD AND FEEDBACK CONNECTIONS
A clarification of the function of the different layers and their inter-
connections is probably best explained by concrete (simplified)
examples. Figure 5 shows an example schematically illustrating
visual feed forward information processing from the receptor level
up to the unimodal level.
In the example, a “person symbol” in cyan color shall be rec-
ognized. For this purpose, receptors are connected to cells of the
feature level and cells of the feature level are connected to the
FIGURE 5 | Feedforward visual information processing from receptor
level to unimodal level (excitatory forward connections not depicted).
unimodal level via exhibitory connections. For reasons of clar-
ity, the connections are not depicted in the figure. Activated cells
are highlighted with yellow color. The feature level shows a topo-
graphic structure, meaning that neighboring receptors project on
neighboring feature cells. As indicated by its name, cells of the
feature level respond to different features of a visual image. In the
given example, cells respond to shapes like circles, crosses, or edges
of a specific color. In Figure 5, just one segment of the whole visual
field is shown. Other segments of the visual field project on other
cells of the feature layer. Cells on the unimodal level now receive
input from feature cells of different sectors. In the concrete exam-
ple, the depicted cell recognizes a person if a circle, a cross, and an
edge feature are recognized in the right spatial arrangement at a
certain location. Unlike assumed in F. Rosenblatt’s classical illus-
tration of the binding problem (see Figure 1), this model therefore
suggests that location information on the feature level is not just an
additional feature like color, shape, and orientation but the crucial
mechanism for binding, which is at this level coded in the spatial
arrangement of cells. From the unimodal level upwards, spatial
integration of information is no longer achieved via topographi-
cal representations but coded by other means (see later sections).
Options for this could be specific firing patterns, the activation
of cross-modal neurons, or focus of attention. At the unimodal
level, cells generally respond to visual images (e.g., a person) inde-
pendent of the color, size, orientation, etc. of the image except if
those features are very characteristic for the object. Therefore, like
for location information, these characteristics have to be coded by
additional means.
Besides feedforward connections, the visual cortex also shows
a number of feedback connections. The function of those con-
nections is however not yet well understood. In the example of
Figure 6, it is shown what important role inhibitory feedback
connections can have in perception. Let’s assume that, similar like
in the example of Figure 5, three neighboring cells representing
a circle, a plus, and an edge are active at the feature level. On
the unimodal level, there does however now not only exist a cell
representing a person but another cell representing a cross. Via
the depicted exhibitory forward connections alone, now both the
“person cells” and the “cross cells” would be activated. However,
the activation of the “cross cell” would be inappropriate. To avoid
this concurrent undesired activation, there exists an inhibitory
feedback connection (depicted as dotted line). By this means, the
activation of the “cross cell” is deactivated as soon as the “person
cell” representing the actual perceptual image is activated.
FOCUS OF ATTENTION
A further mechanism taking an important role in perceptual bind-
ing is focus of attention. Focus of attention comes in to play if
several objects are present in the environment concurrently. This
is well illustrated by the example of Figure 7. There, two person
symbols, one in cyan and one in green are present in the visual
field at the same time at different locations. On the feature level,
which is topographic, this would lead to an activation of feature
cells in two different areas (marked in yellow). On the unimodal
level, this could lead to an activation of the “person cell.” However,
at this level, a binding problem occurs as two persons are present
and no conclusive information about the location and color (i.e.,
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FIGURE 6 | Function of feedback connections (solid lines indicated
excitatory connections, dotted lines indicate inhibitory connections).
FIGURE 7 | Potentially ambiguous perception in case of presence of
multiple objects (excitatory feedforward connections not depicted).
the details) of the person symbol can be obtained. To resolve this
problem, focus of attention can be applied.
Figure 8 shows the principle how focus of attention interacts
with perception. In the model, focus of attention interacts on the
feature level. Via inhibitory connections from the focus of atten-
tion, the activation of all feature cells outside a certain spatial
range is reduced in comparison to the range to which the focus
of attention is currently directed. This way, only information cur-
rently “inside” the focus of attention is further processed in higher
levels (see Figure 8A). Once processed, the focus of attention is
shifted to the next area (see Figure 8B) and the features activated
there are now processed. Apart from directing focus of attention
toward particular spatial areas of the perceptual field, it is also con-
ceivable that focus of attention can be directed toward particular
features (e.g., particular colors, particular shapes, etc.). Seen form
a physiological perspective, focus of attention could be represented
by a top-down-induced pattern of synchronous firing of neurons
representing features being currently in the focus of attention.
REPRESENTATION OF LOCATION INFORMATION
As already outlined in the previous sections, information about
the location where particular features, objects, and the like are per-
ceived has an important role in binding. This becomes particularly
important for correctly binding features to higher-level concepts in
case multiple objects/events occur at the same time. As explained
in Section “Feedforward and Feedback Connections,” up to the
feature level, location information about features is represented
topographically. Thus binding in those first layers particularly
occurs between features represented by spatially proximal neurons.
However, the unimodal and multimodal level of perception no
longer show these topographic representations. Thus other mech-
anisms need to act in later levels of perception to code location
information. A particularly interesting question in this context is
how unimodal representations of different sensory modalities are
bound to correct multimodal perceptions if different objects and
events occur at the same time. One example could be that two
persons are currently perceived in a room at different locations
from which one is currently talking and the other is not. How
can perceptual information be correctly bound in order to per-
ceive which of the two persons is currently talking? Apparently,
the information where in the room a voice was heard and where in
the room the two persons were seen has to be matched adequately
and the acoustic and visual information having been perceived
in an overlapping spatial range has to be merged while the other
visual information should not be considered. One possible way
to achieve this merging is the mechanism of focus of attention
introduced in Section “Focus of Attention.” In this case, the spatial
range within which information is considered and therefore can
be merged would be limited in each moment of time. The question
is however if focus of attention is the only mechanism available
as it is quite exact but relatively time consuming. As suggested
in Section “Synchronous Firing,” synchronous firing of neurons
could have the function to translate the topographic representa-
tion of location information of the feature level into a temporal
representation in the unimodal level and above. One mechanism
to induce synchronous firing could be focus of attention, which
however has the disadvantage to be relatively slow. Therefore, other
alternatives are conceivable. On the one hand, theoretically, con-
currently activated neurons of the feature level in a proximal spatial
range could produce such a firing pattern. However, when going
beyond information processing for just one particular modality,
the question is how synchronization in firing between different
sensory modalities can be achieved for representing the same spa-
tial ranges. This would be necessary for multimodal merging of
information. One possible mechanism suggested here for achiev-
ing this inter-modal synchronization could be cross-modal (i.e.,
multimodal) cells in levels lower than the multimodal level hav-
ing the function to spatially interrelate representation of different
modalities. Until recently, the general view in neuroscience was
that multimodal integration is mainly limited to higher cortical
levels after extensive unisensory processing has taken place (i.e.,
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FIGURE 8 | Role of focus of attention in perception. (A) Focus of attention is switched to lower left part of perceptual field. (B) Focus of attention is switched
to upper right part of perceptual field.
in the multimodal level of our model). However, recent stud-
ies report that cells responding to activations of more than one
sensor modality can already be found in lower levels of percep-
tion (Ghazanfar and Schroeder, 2006; Cappe et al., 2009). The
question that has so far not been completely clarified is what the
function of those cross-modal neurons is. As outlined above, we
propose that their function (or at least one of their functions)
is to establish a “spatial correlation” between different modalities.
This suggestion is in accordance with findings from Pascual-Leone
and Hamilton (2001) who report about recordings of patterns
from cross-modal neurons in the visual cortex responding to both
visual and acoustic stimulation. Results showed that none of these
neurons demonstrated a frequency tuning curve comparable to
what can be obtained in the primary auditory cortex. Instead, the
acoustic responsiveness of the“audio-visual”cells depended on the
location of the sound source in space. Accordingly, they conclude
that those neurons are engaged in the representation of the spatial
localization of stimuli independent of the sensory modality. There-
fore, these cells could play an essential role in “location-sensitive”
binding of stimuli of different modalities.
KNOWLEDGE AND MEMORY
In certain situations, perceptual information originating from
sensor values can be ambiguous. Furthermore, perception needs
mechanisms to preserve the outcome of feature binding to avoid
continuous reprocessing of information and to be able to consider
former relevant percepts no longer activating sensory receptors.
Top-down processes like knowledge, memory, and expectation
can help to resolve “conflicts” and store processed information.
An example for how the interaction of those top-down processes
with perception takes place is given in Figure 9. The example shows
information processing on the unimodal and multimodal level. In
the visual modality, the presence of a person is detected. In the
acoustic modality, a voice is recognized. On the multimodal level,
this information could now lead to two different conclusions: (1)
the person is talking, (2) the person is listening to the radio posi-
tioned right next to him. Taking just the current time instant is not
enough to reach an unambiguous recognition. Therefore, mem-
ory and knowledge interact at this level. By these mechanisms, it
can be memorized that the person switched on the radio several
minutes ago. Additionally considering that the person is alone in
the room and usually does not talk to himself, it can be concluded
that the person is listening to the radio. Accordingly, the activation
of the cell representing the “person talking” is deactivated by those
top-down mechanisms via inhibitory connections. Principally, the
interaction of perception and knowledge, memory, and expec-
tation can take place at every level. However, simulation results
showed that interaction at higher levels corresponding to the uni-
modal and multimodal level are more efficient and therefore more
likely. Furthermore, inhibitory as well as exhibitory top-down
connections would principally be possible. However, computer
simulations and system theory showed that a too large number of
excitatory top-down connections can negatively influence system
stability (Velik, 2008).
OVERVIEW OF INVOLVED BINDING MECHANISMS
Based on the processing mechanisms described in the last sections,
this section shall now give a suggestion what binding mechanisms
are applied at different levels of perception (see Figure 10). One
central point that has to be considered is that information about
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the location of perceptual images of one layer is crucial for a correct
binding in the next higher layer.
The model suggests that at the feature level, which is topo-
graphic in structure, combination coding is the means of choice
for binding as at this level, the activation of cells is highly specific
to particular features concerning shape, color, movement, etc. at
a certain position. Information about the location of features is
coded in the topographic maps. The represented features are fea-
tures that occur very frequently in the environment. Therefore,
combination coding is the most efficient option to handle it.
FIGURE 9 | Influence of knowledge, memory, and expectation on
perception.
The parallel coding assures that all information in the perceptual
field is quickly accessible. Only in later stages, filter and selection
mechanisms are applied to reduce the amount of information that
has to be processed at each time instant.
On the unimodal and multimodal level, a combination of
population coding and binding by synchrony seems to be the
dominating binding mechanisms. At his levels (groups of), cells
are activated by particular perceptual images independent of the
concrete location, size, orientation, etc. of those images. Location
information is no longer represented topographically but via other
mechanisms. A possible candidate for preserving this information
is some kind of temporal pattern. Further mechanisms involved
could be cross-modal cells responding to features of two or more
modalities concurrently and focus of attention (see Representa-
tion of Location Information). The transition from the feature
level to the unimodal level is of course no abrupt junction but
rather a continuous change over the layers from smaller to larger
perceptual fields and accordingly from more location specific and
simple to less location specific and more complex features.
Additionally to the “bottom-up” processes just described, the
mechanisms of focus of attention and knowledge, memory, and
expectation support perceptual binding in a top-down manner.
A description of how this interaction takes place has already
been given in Sections “Focus of Attention” and “Knowledge and
Memory.”
Concerning binding in the lower levels of perception, partic-
ularly the feature level, it is conceivable that at early develop-
ment stages, on-demand binding is prevalent basing on binding
by synchrony and focus of attention. Only later on, commonly
occurring feature combinations become hardwired. To achieve
this, Hebb’s law of correlations in activations could come into
action: Connections of cells being frequently activated concur-
rently are strengthened more and more until they represent
particular feature combinations in a stable way.
FIGURE 10 | Overview of binding mechanisms in perception at different hierarchical levels.
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The remaining so far suggested “combined” binding hypothe-
ses (see Feedforward and Feedback Connections) are simply a
combination of a subset of the above mentioned mechanisms.
The bundling and bounding theory correlates to the described
topographic binding mechanisms at the feature level plus the
“focus of attention”-restricted processing in higher levels to allow
unambiguous binding. However, unlike the model suggested here,
the bundling and bounding hypothesis makes no concrete state-
ment on how and at what level focus of attention interacts with
perception. In comparison to the bundling and bounding theory,
the feature-integration theory of attention additionally considers
the mechanism of knowledge, memory, and expectation. How-
ever, again, in contrast to the above described model, no concrete
statement is made about the possible ways of interaction. Finally,
the theory of top-down synchronization covers aspects of the
concepts of binding via focus of attention and binding via knowl-
edge, memory, and expectation. However, once more, prior to
this model, no statements about the concrete ways of interaction
were made.
CONCLUSION
In this article, an overview was given about so far suggested solu-
tions to the binding problem in perception. It was shown that
the different existing solutions are not contradictory but that it
is actually very likely that all of them play a crucial role in bind-
ing, however each of them only at specific hierarchical levels of
perception and during specific periods of “perceptual knowledge
acquisition.”Accordingly, a new model for perceptual binding was
suggested.
To our knowledge, prior studies about binding have mainly
focused on the visual cortex and either on a description of one
individual binding mechanism only or (to a much less extend) a
combination of two (or at maximum three) concepts. However, an
integration of the full range of binding mechanisms in to one con-
clusive model, which reaches additionally from the receptor level
up to the multimodal level of perception, has not been provided
yet. This article presented a model answering the question what
binding mechanisms act at what level in what way and how the
interaction of the different mechanisms can take place. We think
that having available such a first “global” model will make it much
easier to elaborate further details on specific binding mechanisms
in different areas and hierarchical levels (e.g., by applying dynamic
system theory) and also to integrate newly upcoming insights (e.g.,
if neurotransmitter systems or astrocytes play a role in binding).
Computer simulations (Velik, 2008; Velik and Boley, 2010) showed
that this “integrative” concept of binding can provide a conclusive
and feasible solution for merging sensory information. The next
step is now to validate the model by searching for physiological
evidence of the hypotheses presented. This work can however not
be performed by one single research group alone. With this arti-
cle, we would therefore like to encourage the research community
to validate our model and hypotheses and to either confirm their
validity or to provide constructive critique and/or suggestions for
adaptations.
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